h e fall of Eastern European communism in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 raised high hopes. Perhaps lessons drawn from southern Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere could help speed democratization in the former Soviet bloc. Yet the post-communist societies began the process of democratization without a private business sector or a functioning civil society, in contrast to recent success stories such as Spain. The former communist countries had experienced decades of one-party dictatorship, a centrally administered, state-owned economy, limited civil freedoms, and ideological indoctrination. To the extent that the mass public plays a critical role in the success or failure of democratization, communism may have bequeathed popular outlooks and behaviors that ill prepare these societies We seek to compare and contrast our analyses of political participation in three former Soviet republics with the patterns found elsewhere. In relating recent mass behavior patterns to the prospects for democratization, our initial expectations will be derived from two distinct literatures: comparative studies of public participation in noncommunist countries, mostly though not exclusively Western democratic systems, and the study of public participation in communist countries. Before turning to analyses of data from Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, therefore, we review the pertinent findings from previous surveys of public behavior and generate a series of hypotheses about mass behavior in these Soviet and now post-Soviet societies. Next, we discuss, in turn, issues of (1) the overall level of participation in the society, (2) how many distinct "modes" of participation characterize these publics, and (3) what can be learned from the cross-national and cross-temporal comparisons that our data permit us to make.
PARTICIPATION LEVELS
Democracy-a system of rule by "the people" -requires as a matter of definition that a broader group than just top officeholders take part in the country's political struggles. A democracy must rest on influential actions on the part of the citizens. But what types of actions are mandated, how often must they occur, and how many citizens must so act to give life to popular rule? These questions remain poorly understood.
The so-called "classical liberal theory of democracy" stressed the need for informed and active citizens, the more the better. Such citizens were deemed crucial for selecting capable representatives and for keeping tabs on them between elections. This outlook was called into question beginning in the 1940s for resting on assumptions about human behavior that were false (Schattschneider 1942; Schumpeter 1942) . For example, early survey research in the United States showed that citizen attitudes and behaviors did not match the image of active and informed citizens found in classical liberal theory (Campbell et al. 1960 ). These surveys found the "attentive public" to be a rather small proportion of society. There has even been debate about whether people really have political opinions, that is, abiding preferences or views apart from how they formulate answers to specific survey questions (Converse 1964 (Converse , 1970 . In addition, research shows that, in most democracies, a rather small minority of citizens undertakes any politically relevant behaviors beyond voting (Rokkan 1962, esp. 71; Dalton 1988, chaps. 3-4) . This is true for such socially approved activities as campaigning on behalf of a candidate for office as well as for such "unconventional" activities as demonstrating or going on strike. As research into patterns of public political participation made these points clear, a view became increasingly prominent that democracy rests more on contestation among elites than on mass participation. In this view, democracy requires no more than regularly occurring opportunities for masses to pass review on the actions of the elites (and to replace government leaders if elite actions are found wanting). Thus, elections without undue restrictions are a sufficient indicator of democracy.
Other recent theorists, however, argue that public participation is central to . democracy and that contemporary democracies should strive to broaden and improve participation even between elections-for example, initiating petition drives, writing letters to politicians, working for local political party organizations (Barber 1984; Pateman 1970) . Not only does an active citizenry provide a basis for controlling elites (and thereby vitalizing the legal and electoral controls), an active citizenry is involved in the actual processes that make democracy what it is; the members of society must "do democracy." These theorists call attention to the importance of public education and of a large flow of information through the mass media if citizens are to formulate preferences and use their participation to pursue those preferences. Some call for more extensive, proactive measures to involve the public in the task of governance. Almond and Verba's (1963) pioneering cross-national study argued an intermediate position: that a democracy is best supported when its society includes a mixture of the politically attentive and active ("citizens"), the attentive but only slightly active ("subjects"), and the nonattentive ("parochials"). 2 The type of political culture that Almond and Verba associated with successful democratic stability, the civic culture, has more subjects than citizens: the potential for mobilizing the subjects into activity around one or another issue produces a check on the elite without the stress that would be caused by an upsurge of actual activity.3
From a different point of view, applying either of these perspectives in the societies of the former Soviet Union is premature because even the "low" levels of participation found in Western democracies are much higher than levels that were possible in communist societies. To many observers, communist societies were "totalitarian"-the state had achieved virtually total dominance over society (Arendt 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956) . The political activities generally studied in Western countries either were absent in the communist countries or, when they existed, constituted something other than genuine participation because the government was forcing people to engage in them (Sharlet 1967; cf. Roeder 1989) .4 Consequently, a central theme ofintellectual debate within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the 1980s and 1990s was how to create (or re-create) a genuine "civil society," a society not under complete state control (e.g. , Miller 1992; Poznanski 1992; Weigle and Butterfield 1992) . ZMilbrath (1965) has referred to the categories as "gladiators," "spectators," and "apathetics." 3Their conclusions therefore link Truman's (1951) conclusions about the role of potential groups in a pluralist democracy to Huntington's (1968) argument about the dangers of excessive participation.
~The image of communist states as totalitarian was highly contested beginning in the late 1960s (PIeron 1970; Hough 1977b) .
A civil society can be defined as:
an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of nonstate activities-economic and cultural production, household life and voluntary associations-and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions .... (Keane 1988, 14) Civil society has two dimensions. The first is what is sometimes called "the private sector": nonstate economic activities in which firms and individuals compete against each other for economic gain (and, ideally, enrich the society and the state in the process). The stress falls on the autonomy, privacy, and liberty of citizens. The second dimension focuses not on civil society as a rat race but as the source of community for individuals. The stress falls on citizens' identity, societal traditions, and the resulting bonds among people. All the various activities which people choose to undertake together with their fellow members of society form a resilient "social fabric" (Seligman 1992; see also the discussion of what makes a "civic community" in Putnam 1993, 86-91) . These two dimensions can work at cross purposes but need not do so.
Both dimensions of civil society can serve democracy by checking and counterbalancing state institutions which might otherwise take on authoritarian or totalitarian traits. The private economic sphere generates a nonstate means of acquiring status and influence over the state. This limits the ability of state elites to exclude certain groups, ideas, or policies from the political process, thereby limiting popular rule (Ware 1987, 7-16) . To the extent a civil society in the communitarian sense exists, even a dominating state will be unable to manipulate society as it wishes. Yet many observers believe that the former Soviet societies had weak civic traditions before the advent of Communism, and totalitarian rule abused even that limited stock of social capital. Without norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, the Hobbesian outcome of the [Italian) Mezzogiorno-amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic stagnation-seem likelier than successful democratization and economic development. (Putnam 1993, 183) If communism indeed lacked a civil society, levels of participation should be significantly lower in the newly postcommunist societies than in established democracies, especially if participation is understood broadly to include membership in an array of social activities. A different expectation, however, is produced by several studies of Soviet-era citizen activity which suggested that Soviet citizens had a palette of participatory channels through which they could potentially exert genuine influence, albeit not all Soviet citizens used these channels and the influence was over matters of "low politics" not "high politics" (Di Franceisco and Gitelman 1984; Friedgut 1979; Hahn 1988; Hough 1977a; Little 1976) .
The wave of emigration from the Soviet Union in the 1970s provided an opportunity to survey individuals who had grown up and lived most of their lives in the USSR. The Soviet Interview Project (SIP) was the most comprehensive effort to survey these emigres. Bahry and Silver (1990) provide a portrait of Brezhnev-era political activism using SIP data. They find that public political participation in the Soviet Union was multifaceted and derived from complex motivations. Many channels of public behavior were available as options to those interested in the tangible and intangible rewards such participation bestowed. They conclude, therefore, that Soviet society had developed a stratum of citizens oriented toward social activity in the limited political realm the regime permitted (and a smaller but important stratum of those willing to go beyond official bounds).
For several reasons, it is important to reexamine the patterns found by Bahry and Silver. For one thing, the final political generation they examine came of age in the 1970s. Those who came of age in the 1980s, however, are now a key generation whose behavior will be critical in shaping the future of the society. In addition, their findings bear reexamining with data drawn from the societies themselves rather than from emigres. Also, the SIP samples mapped to the urban sectors of Soviet society, and including rural samples in one's analyses might produce divergent findings. Finally, of course, the range of permissible behaviors grew tremendously since the time the SIP data were collected. The importance of popular political activism in shaping the course of the Soviet Union and of post-Soviet societies rose sharply in the 1980s.
To establish some basis for what would be a "high" or "low" level of activism in comparative perspective, table 1 provides data on levels of different activities found by other survey projects. The response levels are mostly from Western democracies, although the Verba, Nie, and Kim project included two developing countries, India and Nigeria. The bottom row presents the results from the SIP survey of Soviet emigres. These various data were gathered at different times in quite different countries. The questions asked were not designed to be directly comparable outside the bounds of a given survey project. This is especially true for comparisons between the SIP data concerning Soviet reality and data from Western democracies. We therefore are quite aware of the dangers of drawing conclusions from the comparison that table 1 presents (cf. Kim, Nie, and Verba 1974, 107) . They do provide, however, the desired baseline for average participation levels in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania.
As noted earlier, voting is by far the most common form of political participation across all the countries. Beyond voting, each country combines different tendencies toward the other activities. 5 The data show less of a contrast than expected between the data from the noncommunist societies and those gathered from former Soviet citizens. For example, with regard to the more difficult forms of activity, such as contacting officials or the media, Brezhnev-era Soviet respondents were more likely than citizens in most of the other surveyed countries to engage in such behavior. Another example is electoral activity-various acts designed to support a political candidate or party-in which 12% of the SIP respondents had engaged, ' See the discussions in Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978b, chap. 2) and Barnes, Kaase, et al. (1979, esp. chaps. 5-6). placing them above data from Austria, West Germany, and Britain in other studies. 6 We will return to the figures presented in table 1 when we contrast them with our data.
Modes of Participation
Studies of mass participation in the 1950s and 1960s tended to accept that scholars could conceive of "participatoriness, " or activism, as a single dimension ranging from the least taxing forms of political activity to the most strenuous, potentially embarrassing, or otherwise costly (Lane 1959; Milbrath 1965) . By the 1970s, however, evidence increasingly suggested that different types of politically relevant activities fall into distinct "modes," each of which potentially attracts different people and has a different impact on political life in the country Goel 1975; Salisbury 1975; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978b) . Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978, appendix A) , who conducted one of two major cross-national studies of participation during the 1970s, postulated five dimensions along which forms of participation could vary: (1) whether the activity is meant to communicate information to political leaders or pressure the leaders or both; (2) whether the outcome affects an individual or a larger portion of society; (3) the extent to which conflict with others is involved; (4) the extent to which the activity involves cooperating with others; and (5) the degree of initiative required of the individual participating. Based on these attributes, Verba, Nie, and Kim were then able to distinguish campaign activity, voting activity, communal activity, and particularized contact (activity between individuals and institutions for the individual's private purposes) as distinct modes of political participation. They explicitly excluded from their study unconventional or illegal behavior on the grounds that they were interested in how democracies operate. By contrast, the other major study of the 1970s, the Political Action surveys, placed particular stress on unconventional activity . Milbrath and Goel's (1977) review of the literature led them to incorporate both conventional and unconventional actions falling into six modes: (1) voting; (2) working for a party or candidate; (3) community activism; (4) contacting officials; (5) protest behavior; and (6) communications activities.
Those analyzing Soviet citizen participation also concluded that politically relevant behavior needed to be classified into different modes. Di Franceisco and Gitelman, for instance, distinguished three modes of participation: "formalritualistic" behaviors, which the regime encouraged, citizen-initiated contacts with 6Beyond the general caveat entered earlier concerning the difficulties in comparing cross-national data such as these, we remind the reader that Soviet elections did not involve competition among parties. Rather, they were intended as demonstrations of support for the polity and regime as a whole. Those who campaigned, helped get out the vote, counted ballots, or engaged in other electoral activities were motivated not by loyalty to one electoral party out of several but by the various carrots and sticks that party and state officials could bring to bear. Nevertheless, there is a congruence between Western and Soviet electoral activity in that Soviet electoral activities were not strictly mandatory, required extra involvement that not all citizens would undertake, and were expressly "political." Kim, Nie, and Verba 1974; McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina 1984; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978a . na = not asked. Voted: In the Verba, Nie, and Kim study, the question asked how often the respondent had voted in previous national elections (NATVOT). The figures here represent the sum of the percentage of those answering always (in Japan); every time or most of the time (in India); all or sometimes missed (in Nigeria). In the Political Action surveys, the question asked if they had voted in the last election. In the SIP survey, the question asked if they voted always or sometimes during their last normal period in the USSR (before they had made public their plans to leave).
Electoral Activity: In general, this refers to activities in support of a political candidate or party such as handing out brochures door to door. For the Verba, Nie, and Kim study, the questionnaires asked respondents "Have you ever worked for a party in an election campaign in the last three years, such as distributing leaflets or playing an active role in campaign rallies?" (question 355, PARTYWRK). In the Political Action surveys, this refers to a question about whether the respondent had ever spent time working for a political party or candidate. The NES question read "Did you do any work for one of the parties or candidates?" Attend Meeting/Rally: This refers to attending nonprotest, pro-candidate or pro-party rallies. The Verba, Nie, and Kim question wording for different countries (variable NRALLYI) was "How often have you attended political meetings or rallies, including rallies held during elections?' or a variant. The Political Action surveys asked how often they attend a political meeting or rally; the percentage reflects those who indicated they had ever done so. The NES question read "Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners or things like that?" Demonstrate: For the NES, one question asked about sit-ins, demonstrations, or protests concerning national problems; a second concerned local problems. Sign a petition: For the NES, the first number is from a question specifying a petition concerning the national government while the second is for a petition concerning the local government.
Contact Officials: The Verba, Nie, and Kim questionnaires distinguished between contacting officials at different levels of government. Listed from left to right in that column, these levels are: for Austria, city (NCON), provincial (EXCONT), and national (NA TCON); for India, local (COMELITI) and block/ district/ state (EXELITI); for Japan, local (COMELITI) and extra-local (EXELITI); for Nigeria, district, regional, or national (EXELITI). The Political Action data refer to "public officials or politicians." The first number for the NES, from 1984, comes from a question asking respondents about contacting their representative to Congress or anyone in the representative's office; the second concerns contacting an official about a local problem.
Contact the Media: Write, phone, or visit an editorial worker or the editorial office of a newspaper, magazine, or television station or network. The first number for the NES refers to the question specifying that the contact concerned some national problem; the second number is from a question regarding a local problem.
Member of a Social Organization: The Verba, Nie, and Kim surveys asked whether the respondent was an active member in a community action organization. The Political Action surveys (including the results from Spain reported by McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pinal asked respondents about membership in from 15 to 19 different types of organization, including political parties, athletic clubs, neighborhood groups, and professional associations. The figures for the SIP interviews show the range for membership in a housing commission, parents' committee, militia or comrades' court, and committees at work.
'" = Last period in which the respondent resided in the USSR.
officials through letters or personal visits, and contacts over implementation (what Verba, Nie, and Kim had referred to as "particularized contacting"). Bahry and Silver (1990, 830-31) found that four modes characterized politically relevant behavior in their sample: unconventional activism, compliant political activism (Oi Franceisco and Gitelman's formal-ritualistic activities), social activism (membership in neighborhood groups, for example), and contacting (collapsing Oi.Franceisco and Gitelman's two forms of contacting). Bahry and Silver thus broaden the number of modes that Oi Franceisco and Gitelman discuss. They also portray a wider array of channels by which citizens might check state power. Oi Franceisco and Gitelman saw at least two of their three modes of participation, formal-ritual behavior and contacts over implementation, as unsupportive of democracy or even antidemocratic in their impact on society because engaging in those actions did not strengthen channels for and accustom citizens to the idea of working to check the state. By contrast, Bahry and Silver's four modes include three that centered around citizens checking the state. Bahry and Silver's attention to social activism is helpful as well. The civilsociety perspective discussed above stresses the critical role that a web of organized nonstate groupings plays in the operation of democratic systems, as opposed to just the "level" of participation. It also points to the need for multiple institutional links-political parties, trade unions, the media, and others-between the mass public and political elites. Note that the argument linking democracy to a strong civil society resembles that made by modernization theorists, who also emphasize the formation of secondary associations in societies with broadly educated publics, large middle classes, and market economies (Almond 1990; Lerner 1958; Lipset 1960 ).
Cross-National and Over-Time Patterns
The question of the extent to which the Soviet regime was able to create a "Soviet" society, as opposed to keeping under control a variety of distinct societies, deserves investigation with regard to patterns of political behavior as well as with regard to the patterns of political values.? Lithuanians consider their society to be generally part of the Western historical tradition in a way that Russia and the eastern portion of Ukraine, at least, are not. A Lithuanian republic stretched over much of east central Europe from the Baltic to the Black seas in the fifteenth century. Eventually this territory was lost, with the remaining Polish-Lithuanian state being incorporated into the Russian empire in the late eighteenth century. Lithuania regained independent statehood following World War I and remained independent until the Soviet army overran it in 1940. For virtually all ethnic Lithuanians in Lithuania, the resulting incorporation into the Soviet Union was illegitimate. When protest became possible in the late 1980s, citizens of the Baltic 7For an investigation of this question with regard to political values, see Reisinger et al. (1994). republics, including Lithuania, were quicker to form into popular front organizations and push for an end to communist rule. Similar organizations emerged in Russia and Ukraine, but somewhat later and with less popular support. If this historical background translated into a general rejection by Lithuanian citizens (especially those ethnically Lithuanian) of Soviet norms and institutions, then we should expect fewer of them to engage in contacting behavior and more of them to be active in opposition to the Soviet regime.
With regard to changes across the three years in which we conducted our surveys, we can examine what impact the end of the Soviet Union had. Observers frequently claim that from 1992 on citizens of the post-Soviet countries began to lose the political excitement engendered from 1987 to 1991 by the reforms and clashes (e.g., White 1994, 17) . Several factors are seen as encouraging this decline in the public's interest and involvement in politics. First, the effort to replace the Soviet regime with that of one's own republic had been a major motivation for many to engage in political activity, and that battle had been won. Second, the realization of how difficult are the challenges facing each new state and its society began to sink in. Problems of security and law and order became more evident. Efforts to privatize and marketize the economy got underway, causing hardship for vast numbers. For these reasons, the exciting phase of political struggle had ended, leading the populace to see less value in being politically active.
We have derived several expectations from previous studies of political participation. We can express those expectations in hypothesis form as follows:
HI) Overall levels of political activity in these post-Soviet societies are low compared with countries that did not experience totalitarian conditions. H2) These societies are not "civil societies" because levels of membership in civil organizations of various kinds are low compared with levels in countries that did not experience totalitarian conditions. H3a) Political activity in these post-Soviet societies falls into distinct modes of behavior.
H3b) Political activity in these post-Soviet societies falls into modes similar to those found elsewhere.
H4a) Lower levels of conventional behavior characterize Lithuania in 1990 and 1991 than the levels in Russia and Ukraine because Lithuania's populace was less well integrated into Soviet norms but conventional behavior should rise in 1992 following independence.
H4b) Higher levels of unconventional behavior characterize Lithuania than the levels in Russia and Ukraine because Lithuania's populace was less well integrated into Soviet norms. HS) Levels of participation, especially unconventional participation, will fall in all three societies in 1992 as political apathy sets in.
We examine each in turn, using data from mass surveys in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, which we now describe.
Analyses
We use data from the University oflowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys conducted in the springs of 1990, 1991, and 1992 . A representative sample of adult citizens was interviewed in three now-independent countries that were, until late 1991, Soviet republics-Lithuania, Ukraine, and Russia (the portion west of the Ural Mountains).8 These particular societies were selected on the basis of population size, economic importance within the Soviet Union, and political relevance. Russia and Ukraine have the largest populations and highest GNP among the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union. Although Lithuania accounted for less than 2% of the Soviet population, it was politically very important because, being among the Baltics, it provides hypotheses regarding different degrees of integration into the Soviet Union. In 1990, 600 respondents were interviewed in each of the three republics. In 1991, the target sample was increased to 1,400 in Russia and 1,000 in Ukraine, leaving a sample size of 600 in Lithuania. In 1992, the target sample was 1,300 in Russia, 900 in Ukraine, and 500 in Lithuania. These distributions allowed for reasonable representation of the republic's minority as well as majority populations, especially in Ukraine and Lithuania where the nonindigenous groups comprised 27% and 20% of the respective total populations. It also allowed for inclusion of both rural and urban respondents. Individual respondents were interviewed in their homes by native speakers, with interviews lasting approximately 30-50 minutes. 9 'The sample approach used for selecting respondents was a four-stage stratified sample. At the initial stage each republic was divided into strata reflecting the following criteria: the extent of urbanization, geographic region, the distribution of nationalities, and population density. These criteria produced eight strata for Ukraine, 12 for Russia, and four strata for Lithuania. The second stage of the sample involved listing the places that fell into each stratum and selecting with probabilities proportionate to size, a number of sampling places (primary sampling units, or PSUs) from each stratum. The 1991 and 1992 studies had 81 PSUs overall. The third stage of the sample involved enumerating all the voting districts for each of the PSUs. Between four and 23 voting districts were randomly selected for each PSU depending on the size of the place. The final stage of sampling involved selecting specific individuals from the voter lists, cross-referenced with residence records, for each of the selected voting districts.
·One previous concern about conducting mass surveys in the former Soviet Union has been a potential unwillingness of people to grant an interview. In a former authoritarian regime where people have experienced considerable political repression, it is reasonable to wonder if citizens would be willing to grant an interview on sensitive subjects such as political change. Unlike the United States, where survey response rates have plummeted (even the NES now does well to obtain response rates greater than 65%), we have had no such problems in the former Soviet Union. The overall response rates were 89. 4%,83.7%, and 87.4%, respectively, in 1990, 1991, and 1992 . Table 2, table 3, and table 4 present the distribution of answers to six questions posed to respondents in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania concerning their political behavior, as well as a summary measure of how many in each society have ever done any of those activities. Table 2 and table 3 , with results from Russia and Ukraine, indicate a strong similarity between these two societies, with Lithuania's results in table 4 being relatively distinct. We investigate the variety of issues raised by cross-national differences in participation patterns. In this section, we want to pursue hypothesis 1 only, whether the Soviet regime had created a citizenry which would not engage in any politically relevant behavior that the regime did not direct. The summary measure is presented in table 2 through table 4 as a way to indicate what portion of these societies are entirely nonparticipatory. A much lower one than the totalitarian image would lead one to predict. More than two fifths of each society in all three years reports engaging in at least one of the five types of political behavior. In Lithuania, the figures range from two thirds to four fifths in different years. Just based on this crude measure, it is clear that at least a minimum degree of political activism extends quite broadly throughout these former Soviet societies.
Participation Levels
In comparing table 2 through table 4 with the levels of different activities in   table 1 , Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania show similarities to many societies which were never under communist rule. Writing, telephoning, or visiting a media outlet or a politician-a deputy to a local, regional, or union-level soviet (council)-were activities that were officially and socially approved of, though not regimemandated in the way that some activities were. The percentages of Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian citizens who report contacting a media outlet are higher than among both former Soviet citizens (primarily reporting about their behavior during the Brezhnev period) and Americans in the NES surveys. This reflects, it would seem, the encouragement of such contacting by Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost' policies.
Generally, approximately one fifth of the Russian and Ukrainian populaces had contacted their legislator. That level equals or surpasses the levels that Verba, Nie, and Kim found in the 1960s as well as American National Election Studies data from the 1970s and 1980s. It is slightly lower than the levels that Barnes, Kaase, et al. found in the 1970s (and significantly lower than the 52% in the United States). The proportion of Lithuanians who had contacted a politician was approximately half that found in Russia and Ukraine, putting them on a par with the rates of contacting national officials in India and Japan in the Verba, Nie, and Kim study.
We did not ask respondents to provide their reason for contacting a politician, and therefore cannot be sure whether the contacting was initiated to seek special treatment for themselves ("particularized contacting," in the words of Verba, Nie, and Kim, the form of behavior which Di Franceisco and Gitelman stress) or to press more general complaints about public policy or its implementation. Note, however, that the percentage who have called or sent a letter to the media-an Surveys, 1990 Surveys, -1992 activity that could only have been meant to voice a general complaint or demandis higher than the percentage who contacted a politician. So, roughly one seventh of the society reports seeking a modicum of influence over some general issue, a quite respectable level compared with Western democracies.
It is noteworthy that those who have at least once signed a petition or taken part in a demonstration or rally are a significantly bigger portion of all three societies than those who have engaged in contacting behavior. In 1992, for example, roughly three out of 10 Russian respondents have signed a petition, and the same proportion has taken part in a rally or demonstration. Generally, "unconventional," or protest, activities are less common than conventional participation. (Petition signing is an exception, with one fifth to one half of the five national samples in the Political Action surveys of the 1970s reporting that they had done so.) In addition, unconventional participation is more prevalent in the most economically developed, postindustrial societies (Inglehart 1990, chap. 11) . Furthermore, the totalitarian model of Soviet society depicted a populace psychologically unable to engage in politically relevant behavior not sponsored by the regime. The levels of protest behavior we find may not come as a big surprise in light of media coverage of the thousands of demonstrators (on both ends of the political spectrum) who took to Surveys, 1990 Surveys, -1992 the streets of the Soviet Union's biggest cities in recent years. Yet media coverage of demonstrations provides a poor means of estimating the actual proportion of society involved. Our samples show clearly that, by the 1990s, protest politics involved a sizable part of Soviet societies. The levels we find extend beyond urban intellectuals, who represent approximately lO% of the populace.
Moreover, the figures for petition signing are as high as in any of the Western societies surveyed in the Political Action study except for the United States and are several times higher than the figures from the West for demonstrating (see table 1).
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The Political Action surveys found that those who had taken part in an electoral rally were more numerous than those who had participated in a lawful demonstration, but even the former activity is less common in several of the five Western democracies than was demonstrated in Russia, Ukraine, and, especially, Lithuania.
For both conventional and unconventional participation, then, we find Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian publics to be highly participatory by comparative standards. We do not assert that these societies were in the early 1990s or will continue to be more disposed to engage in political activity than citizens in a particular Western society. Beyond the difficulty of comparing across different survey studies, political struggles at the end of the Soviet era, especially in 1990 and 1991, called forth public activity that might not be seen under other conditions. Nevertheless, our data allow us to reject the first hypothesis, that the communist period created a virtually non participatory society with at best a minimal core of urban intellectual activists capable of pressing public demands on the state. Scholars are still in the process of using the current openness of many former Soviet societies to clarify how Russian and other societies within the Soviet Union evolved during the post-Stalin era. Recendy conducted surveys as well as previously unavailable Soviet surveys, for instance, shed a great deal oflight on how societal values shifted in response to new generations and changing conditions. 10 In a similar manner, our findings on the behavioral patterns of current citizens provide some insight into societal change during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The tiny number of open dissidents during these decades, as well as the lack of public outcry against the horrible manner in which the state treated them, suggested that the politically active stratum of Soviet society was only as broad as the active members of the Communist Party. Since many members of the Party were inactive, this meant that perhaps 5% of the adult populace were politically involved and that this small group's motives for political participation included a sizable dose of careerism. For the rest of society, taking any overdy political action meant sticking one's neck out for no good reason. As Di Franceisco and Gitelman (1984) show, many Soviet citizens sought to influence politics almost exclusively by seeking to mitigate the impact of policies on their own lives rather than to try to influence the nature of the policies.
What observers could not determine, in the absence of survey data, was the degree to which the pa~ern of behavior that existed in the 1960s-1980s reflected a lack in Soviet society of the stratum that Almond and Verba (1963) dubbed activists and Milbrath (1965) called gladiators. That is, as Soviet citizens became politically socialized during this era, did virtually none of them gain the psychological disposition toward activity that should have been expected of a reasonable sized minority in an urbanized, industrial country such as the USSR? Or, alternatively, IODebates over the degree and direction of value change among Soviet citizens as well as over the reasons behind it continue (Bahry 1993; Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; Hahn 1991; Reisinger et al. 1994; Remington 1990). was the size of the segment psychologically disposed toward political activity roughly comparable to that found in other developed countries without that disposition translating into political behavior? Before Gorbachev coming to power in 1985, the Soviet regime was outwardly united in its opposition to public criticism of its policies and willing to repress those who publicly dissented. Under Gorbachev, the policy of glasnost' called on people to speak and act out while increasingly public splits in the elite created conditions in which public action made sense (and grew increasingly effective). Our data, gathered at the end of the Gorbachev period, indicate that the number of Soviet citizens willing to take advantage of the new conditions by seeking political influence fits within the parameters discovered in cross-national studies. If regime policies and personnel changed remarkably little in the post-Stalin USSR, the same cannot be said of Soviet society.
We now examine hypothesis 2 concerning the degree to which post-Soviet societies are "civil" in the sense of having a web of private organizations devoted to public social and political affairs. We do so not by analyzing trends in the number of organizations, as others are doing (Hosking, Aves, and Duncan 1992) , but by examining how many citizens belong to one or more such organizations. One problem with the former approach is that the number of tiny, short-lived organizations exploded in recent years but few if any gained significant political impact. A better indication of the potential impact of organized activity would reflect the extent of membership throughout the public. By joining one or more voluntary social organizations, an individual must not only be disposed toward political activity but toward working with others. It is possible, therefore, that the latter disposition is less common than the former. The argument advanced is that the regime's punishment of open dissent as well as its practice of spying on the public made Soviet citizens distrustful of each other. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that many Soviet citizens distrusted all except family and a small coterie of extremely close friends on whom they depended for support.ll If this image is true, even the individually active citizens would be reluctant to work in communal settings, meaning that a genuine civil society will be difficult to create.
We asked whether the respondent belongs to a social organization or initiative group. This formulation reflected our interest in the phenomenon of neformalniye, the informal organizations that began forming at a phenomenal rate in the late 1980s for social, political, or even just recreational purposes. Mariy respondents are likely to have included in their image of the category the "fronts," movements, and "blocs" that formed with more clearly political agendas beginning in 1989. The "social organization/initiative group" formulation is less likely to have been seen as referring to membership in the regime-sponsored socially oriented bodies such as II For efforts to ascertain the level of interpersonal trust in Soviet society, see Bahry and Silver 1987; Gibson and Duch 1993. housing commissions (in which 2.5% of Soviets were found to be active in the SIP data), parents' commissions (10.6%), and people's militia or comrades' court (10.9%) (Bahry and Silver 1990,831) . Such bodies are reasonably comparable to the type of voluntary association examined elsewhere. That is, membership was voluntary, communal, directed most commonly at local issues or problems and often was only indirectly "political" (including athletic clubs, professional associations, neighborhood groups, and others). 12 Our question, then, refers to a form of involvement that differs from both membership in an electoral party and membership in a voluntary association but shares some aspects of each. In a country without a stable party system, belonging to a social organization/initiative group provided a substitute for those who desired to work with others to further one or more political or social goals.
The membership levels that we find represent a smaller portion of society than was the case for contacting, petition signing, and demonstrating: in 1992, 6% in Russia, 9% in Ukraine, and 9% in Lithuania. Moreover, membership in a political party (asked only in 1992) was extremely rare. As table 1 shows, these levels of membership are quite a bit below those for volunt~ry association membership in most countries surveyed. Interpreting these levels comparatively, however, is even more difficult than for contacting and unconventional action. The Political Action data reported in table 1 asked respondents about a number of types of membership that our question would not have called to mind, including party membership, so a better comparison would be the Political Action findings for party membership alone. The Verba, Nie, and Kim figures are more comparable. Yet the Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian figures are at the low end of the range even in comparison with the party membership data from the Political Action surveys as well as for community action group membership in the Verba, Nie, and Kim project. Even if we assume that the levels of public involvement in the type of civic groups that Bahry and Silver (1987, 1990) documented have stayed steady into the 1990s, communal activity is low. In addition, the levels of actual party membership currently existing in the former Soviet Union are minuscule even in relation to the secular decline in party membership (or campaign activity on behalf of a party) that characterizes some key Western democracies during the postwar era (Dalton 1988, 41-45) .
For these reasons, our data provide partial support for hypothesis 2. Relatively few citizens in any country take part in organized political activity, and a couple of the established democracies showed levels of membership in the 1960s that were on a par with these post-Soviet societies. Furthermore, Spain showed similar signs of low societal institutionalization during the early years of its current democratic regime (McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina 1984) . Nevertheless, during this period of transition away from Soviet institutions and norms, the web of social groupings in these three societies is quite sparse.
Modes of Participation
Of the six variables presented in table 2 through table 4, two are forms of contacting behavior (either the media or an official), two can be dubbed unconventional political activities (signing a petition or taking part in a rally), and two indicated a willingness to join with others in formal bodies (either a social movement or a political party). Because membership in a political party is only available for 1992 and because it is such a rare activity, we omit it from the analyses that follow. Thus, we need to examine five activities to determine whether they represent different aspects of a single dimension of "participatoriness" or need to be divided into different modes of participation. Table 5 presents the results of a factor analysis of the five activities (rotated using the promax technique) for the three societies for three years.13 Factor loadings greater than .4 are italicized for convenience. In seven of the resulting nine analyses (for Lithuania in 1990, and for all three countries in 1991 and 1992), the contacting activities loaded significantly on a different factor from that of the unconventional behaviors. The results for Ukraine in 1990 are less clear-cut but also do not suggest a single dimension at work. We need, therefore, to analyze the contacting and unconventional behaviors separately. In four of the nine analyses (Ukraine in all three years plus Russia in 1991) the organizational membership variable loads reasonably well on the factor that has the unconventional behaviors. However, in only one of these cases is the loading greater than .5. Given this, we will keep the membership variable distinct from the unconventional behaviors in the analyses. 14 The results in table 5 make clear that we must reject hypothesis 3a concerning unidimensionality in Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian political behavior. Furthermore, although a full investigation of the correlates of different modes of political behavior is beyond the scope of this article, we want to note that different types of people tend to engage in each of the three modes. The index of contacting behavior is positively and strongly correlated with the age of the respondent whereas the unconventional activity index is just as strongly negatively correlated with age. Former Communist Party members were more likely to have contacted than those 13For a discussion of the appropriateness of factor analysis when using variables that are dichotomous or polytomous, see Kim, Nie, and Verba (1977) .
14Further supporting these patterns are the average interitem covariances for different groups of the five variables. The covariances rise as one subtracts variables. For example, the two contacting behaviors are equally or more strongly interrelated to each other (.13 and .14 in 1991 and 1992) than are the group of all five behaviors (.10 in both years). The same is more dramatically true for the two measures of unconventional behavior (from .24 to .35 over the three years). Also, adding membership in a social organization to the unconventional behaviors lowers the interitem covariance sharply (from .12 to .17 over the three years). Source: University ofIowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys, 1990 Surveys, -1992 never in the Party, but Party membership bears no relationship to unconventional activity. Petition signing and demonstrating are predominately urban phenomena, while the other activities are evenly spread between urban and rural areas. Our three modes generally correspond well to those found elsewhere and discussed above, thus supporting hypothesis 3b. We should note that the covariance between the frequency of contacting the media and contacting a legislator (see table 5) suggests that our index of contacting behavior taps the respondent's interest in advancing general notions about political or social life (Milbraith and Goel's communications activities) rather than particularized contacting, that is, efforts to modify how a policy is implemented in their individual case. Our results therefore match those of Bahry and Silver rather than those ofDi Franceisco and Gitelman, who distinguish the two purposes of contacting. To the extent this is so, it evidences what Almond and Verba called civic competence, as opposed to subject competence. Those who took the trouble to write a letter or visit a legislator at his or her reception room (a small proportion of these three societies) did so because they believed that, to some limited extent, they were "able to affect governmental decisions through political influence" (Almond and Verba 1963,217) .
Based on these findings, our analyses of cross-national and over-time patterns will explore three modes of participation rather than all six activities about which we asked respondents. We combine the two measures of contacting behavior into a single index ranging from zero (the respondent has done neither activity) to four (the respondent has done both and done each more than once). We also combine the two measures of unconventional activity in the same fashion. ( Table 6 shows the distributions that result.) We will analyze the pattern of membership in a social organization or initiative group as our sole measure of joining behavior.
Cross-National and Over-Time Patterns
Hypotheses 4a and 4b both suggested that Lithuania should stand out from Russia and Ukraine but in different directions for different modes. Because Lithuania became part of the Soviet Union several decades later and because of its more Western orientation, we hypothesized that the regime approved conventional activities (including membership in various social organizations) would be less common in Lithuania prior to its independence whereas regime-challenging behaviors would be more common than in Russia and Ukraine. Figure 1 illustrates the trends in each of three modes of participation over the three surveys for each society. (Table 7 provides measures of the differences between the means for each variable between each pair of countries and across the years.) Figure 1 does indeed show that the Russian and Ukrainian publics are generally similar to each other for all three modes of behavior and that the Lithuanian public is distinct. The t-statistics for the differences between Lithuania and the other two countries (shown in table 7) are large and statistically significant in all three years for contacting and unconventional behavior and in 1990 for joining a social organization. Those for the differences between Russia and Ukraine are smaller in seven of the nine instances and statistically significant in four. (Lithuania departing from patterns that prevail in the Slavic portions of the former Soviet Union accords with the relationship found for political values) . Lithuanians are less likely to contact the media or officials than those in other societies, in all three years. Interestingly, the gap narrows in 1992 when a higher proportion of Lithuanian citizens report contacting behavior. This supports hypothesis 4a, which argued that the Lithuanians would be less apt to engage in within-system action while in the Soviet Union but might take it up more frequently following independence. Further tracking is necessary, naturally, to speak of a long-term trend, especially since the t-statistic for the difference between Lithuanian contacting in 1991 and 1992 is significant only at a .1 level.
A sharply higher share of Lithuania's citizens have signed a petition or joined a demonstration than in Russia and Ukraine, thus supporting hypothesis 4b as well. (Table 4 indicates, moreover, that Lithuanian petition signers and demonstrators form an absolute majority of respondents in all three years, excepting only petition signing in 1992.) The stand-off during 1990 and 1991 between the Gorbachev leadership in Moscow and Lithuania's newly elected Sajudis leadership prompted a high degree of public activity. The focus of this activity was largely anti-Moscow, though ethnic Slavs also became active in opposing the separatist policies of Sajudis. The high levels of unconventional behavior reflect these events. The slightly higher levels of membership in a social organization found in Lithuania than in Russia and Ukraine also reflect these events. Since many respondents in 1990 and 1991 would have considered Sajudis to be a movement rather than a political party, our question likely captured trends in that organization's membership. Given Sajudis's overwhelming electoral victory in 1990, we expected that membership levels would be as distinct from those in Russia and Ukraine as are the Lithuanian levels of unconventional behavior. Instead, the levels of belonging to a social organization in Lithuania fall in 1991 and 1992, making them no longer significantly higher than the rising levels in Russia and Ukraine. Once the Sajudis leadership had taken control of the Lithuanian parliament in 1990, the movement's membership began to decline.
We now turn to the frequently heard claim that the end of the Soviet Union in the fall of 1991 marked a turn toward public political apathy (hypothesis 5). Before turning to the data, we should note that our questions asked if the respondent had ever engaged in the contacting and unconventional activities, not whether they had done so in the previous year. Therefore, the changes from one year to the next in levels of activity should, strictly speaking, result from movement into and out of the social populations from which we drew our samples. If that were the only factor influencing changes in the reported levels, then the proportions should either stay the same from one year to the next or increase. A decrease would indicate that participatory citizens were more concentrated in those who died or emigrated between the surveys while newcomers to the adult population were less participatory. This latter scenario is certainly possible over a number of years. Given that our surveys were conducted one year apart, however, this process should have a small impact on our data. Yet we do find several instances of rather sharp declines in the proportion of a society that reports having engaged in these types of activity. Rather than movement into and out of the population, it is likely that the changes involve "errors of omission." Research has revealed the tendency of people to forget what they have done as they get farther away from it in time (Sudman and Bradburn 1982,42-45; Rossi, Wright, and Anderson 1983, 308-to) . Behaviors more than a year before become increasingly likely to be forgotten. We can therefore interpret changes in the proportions that report having ever done one of these activities as being primarily a function of actual changes in behavior from one year to the next.
Some aspects of the data counter the expectation of a growing apathy. For Russia and Ukraine, no downturn in activity is evident with regard to contacting behavior or membership in a social organization or initiative group. The difference between 1991 and 1992 in contacting behavior in Russia is statistically nonexistent. Ukraine shows declines in contacting and joining in 1992, but both leave the level higher than in 1990. As noted earlier, Lithuania shows an upturn in contacting behavior not a decline.
In other regards, however, participation tails off in a way that supports hypothesis 5. As discussed, group membership in Lithuania experiences two years of decline. Over the same three-year period, Lithuania shows even more significant declines in unconventional activity. In these two areas, the coming to power of a reformist leadership marked the high point of participation even though actual independence did not occur until the fall of 1991. In Russia and Ukraine, unconventional behavior also dips significantly but only in 1992. For these two societies, the "defeat" of the old regime and the beginning of a new political phase occurs at the end of 1991.
CONCLUSIONS
Data drawn from surveys in Ukraine, Lithuania, and European Russia reveal three societies with levels of political activism higher than those found in the West for contacting and unconventional behavior yet levels of membership in social organizations lower than those found in successful Western democracies. Focusing only on the former two modes of participation, we could argue that these postSoviet societies do possess the mixture of "citizens" and "subjects" that Almond Political Change in Post-Soviet States 967 and Verba argued characterizes a "civic culture." In particular, our 'findings make clear that Soviet citizens were not demobilized in a way that survived the ending of sanctions against unapproved behavior. In this respect, our findings support those from the SIP project and indicate that the pattern of grassroots activity found by Hahn is not limited to a few localities. When dramatic political struggles made the circumstances right for mass activism, the public responded in levels little different from those that could be expected elsewhere. After a regime change had occurred, each society's pattern of political behavior shifted to less extraordinary patterns.
Our findings suggest that these societies, like other urbanized and industrialized societies, have relatively high proportions of their populaces with the desire and means to influence political life in one way or another. Although we did not explore voting behavior, we should note that the willingness of Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian publics in recent years to vote a post-Soviet elite out of office reinforces the impression that these publics see themselves as politically efficacious. A crucial requirement for democratic governance is that the people be able to check the power of the political elite. Meeting this requirement rests on more than just having a reasonably sized segment of the public with the desire and means to influence politics, but this is a crucial step. However, the public's role in watchdogging and checking the elite has not been institutionalized in the large web of social groupings, organizations, and political parties that characterize stable democracies. In the absence of this web, the trials of daily life in the former Soviet Union may well cause people to diminish their political engagement. Finally, because the organizational development of these societies remains limited, democratic institutions lack a key form of support present in long-standing democracies. For this reason and other reasons, democratic governance in the Soviet successor states will remain fragile for some time. 16 November 1994 Final manuscript received 20 March 1995 
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